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Abstract: During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians 
succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist 
physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there 
have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process 
empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and 
econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay 
between the firm’s potential profitability and its ability to influence law 
enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition 
economies, provide support for this argument. 
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You don't know life. No one lives on wages alone.  
I remember in my youth we earned money by  
unloading railroad freight cars. So, what did we do?  
Three crates or bags unloaded and one for ourselves.  
That is how everybody lives in [our] country. 
 
Leonid Brezhnev, quoted in Kornai (1992) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
One of the least pleasant surprises of the transition from centrally-planned to market 
economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was the extent to which managers 
and politicians were able to maintain control of the stock of socialist physical capital without 
paying the full market prices for those “privatized” assets. We define this process as asset 
stripping. Although its significance is widely recognized,
1 there are no systematic efforts to 
model, measure and understand it empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap. 
There are at least three reasons to study the process of asset stripping. One is that an 
understanding of the determinants and consequences of asset stripping can throw light on the 
relationship economic reform and performance in a weak institutional setting (Rodrik, 
1996). Various mechanisms support a potential negative effect of asset stripping on 
economic performance in such setting.
  For instance, asset stripping diminishes political 
support for reform, maintains an inefficient allocation of talent and stifles the demand for the 
rule of law and for clearly defined property rights (Sonin, 2003).   
Another reason is that asset stripping is important in understanding economic 
performance during the transition from plan to market. The main stylized fact of the 
transition was the dramatic fall of per capita output (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Although 
a number of explanations have been offered, the one that has enjoyed the most success is 
                                                 
1 Roland notes that an unintended consequence of various mass privatization programs in transition 
economies was the widespread stripping of assets from public corporations for private uses (2002, p. 
35). Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) observe that “the transfer of state property to private agents was 
accompanied by the stripping of Russia’s assets.” Stiglitz (2000) uses “looting” to describe the 
process of appropriation of physical and financial assets in Central and Eastern Europe. Johnson et 
al. (2000) define “tunneling” as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their 
controlling shareholders in transition economies. Black et al. (2000), Freeland (2000), Ganev (2001) 
and Goldman (2003) provide detailed case study evidence of asset stripping in transition economies.   2
arguably that based on the notion of “disorganization.” According to Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997), disorganization causes a fall in output because the existing production chains break 
down. Consider a producer of an intermediary input that under central planning is only 
allowed to sell to a certain company. The collapse of central planning means this producer 
can now search for other customers. In successfully doing that (say by exporting), the supply 
chain breaks down, disorganization emerges, and output shrinks. Asset stripping is another 
possible cause of such breakdowns. 
A final reason is that an understanding of asset stripping in the privatization 
experience of transition economies may lead to important lessons for privatization in other 
contexts. Indeed, as we will argue below, our analysis emphasizes the role of bad incentives 
for public officials and weak corporate governance in state owned enterprises. We believe 
these to be relevant in developing countries as well.  
The objective of this paper is three-fold: (a) to construct a simple model of asset 
stripping, (b) to offer an empirical measure of the phenomenon, and (c) to test empirically 
the main implications from the model. We define asset stripping as the process of obtaining 
assets without paying the full market price for them. We focus on former State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) because their weak corporate governance makes them a particularly 
vulnerable target for asset strippers.
2 Our model generates two main insights. The first is that 
a firm’s ability to influence law enforcement officials through bribes or simply through 
political clout is an important determinant of asset stripping, even when law enforcement is 
potentially effective. A second insight is that there is a non-linear relationship between the 
potential profitability of the assets in question and the decision to strip them.  
In order to measure the extent of asset stripping, we use data from a survey of 
directors (CEOs) of manufacturing firms in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and Russia. 
The survey took place in 1997 and covered about 1000 firms. We restrict our sample to 
firms that are not spin-offs from state enterprises (that is, our sample contains only start-ups 
or newly created private firms). According to our measure of asset stripping, the use of 
stripped assets is significantly more extensive in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania. The econometric results support the notion that (political or 
                                                 
2 There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that control was so weak that SOE insiders sold the 
assets to their friends or even themselves. See Stiglitz (2000) for additional discussion of this point.    3
financial) clout is an important determinant of the use of stripped assets. The results also 
strongly support a non-linear relationship between potential profitability and the decision to 
strip assets. Further, these results are robust to various sensitivity checks including different 
estimators and different measures of all key variables in the model. 
The related literature is large, yet almost exclusively theoretical. Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2004) show how asset strippers have a low demand for the rule of law even if it is in their 
collective interest to have high levels of protection for property rights. In the model put 
forward by Tornell and Lane (1999), the existence of non-cooperative powerful groups 
generates, in an environment with weak institutions, a redistributive struggle and, as a result, 
a greater share of resources ends up in nontaxable inefficient activities. There is also an 
important related literature, on the role of law enforcement in transition (see, among others, 
Roland and Verdier, 2003). 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 presents the data set and our measure of asset stripping in transition 
economies. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Early in the transition from centrally planned to market economy assets from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) became available for private ownership. We present a simple model 
where the actors are the government (central or local) and (potential) buyers for these assets. 
We look at a stylized situation where similar quality assets are available from both SOEs and 
the (international) private sector. We assume that SOEs have insiders (e.g. bureaucrats or 
managers) who enjoy significant control over the assets. These insiders have much better 
information about a buyer’s willingness to pay for the assets than state officials. We assume 
that both this informational asymmetry and insiders’ level of control are less significant in 
the private sector. With this assumption we wish to capture the fact that (a) active oversight 
of management will be inherently stronger in the private sector and (b) to the extent that 
private ownership is also foreign ownership, there will be much more experience in 
corporate governance.
3 For our purposes, one important consequence of these assumptions is 
that insiders in SOEs will be able to sell their assets at a price that is lower than the price 
                                                 
3 Tighter control on management has often been indicated as one of the main rationales for the 
privatization process in the first place. See Roland (2000) for a detailed discussion.    4
buyers would have to pay anyone in the private sector, possibly in exchange for a bribe. We 
call this asset stripping. Clearly, buyers still have the option of acquiring the assets from the 
private sector at the market price: as we will show below, this may be the preferred option if 
there is a significant risk that the government will enforce the law against them. We call this 
second option, restructuring.
4 Obviously, asset stripping will not always have to involve the 
acquisition of SOE assets, but what is crucial about our stylized assumption is that asset 
stripping is more likely when assets from SOEs are involved.
5  
Given the various privatization methods used in transition economies and our intent 
to construct a theory of asset stripping that holds in a cross-country framework, we will not 
model explicitly the market or bargaining processes behind asset stripping and restructuring, 
but we will provide a reduced form set-up where the results of this process are reflected in 
our assumptions about the returns each of the two possibilities generates.  
  In our model, buyers are firms looking at the possibility of adding new assets to their 
portfolio. We first assume that in the status quo, they all have a given utility level u , which 
represents the total returns from their current assets.
6 If a firm gets additional assets from the 
private sector, it expects to obtain a return r .This represents the ratio of the profits the firm 
expects from the assets to the cost of acquiring them. Thus, with restructuring, total utility 
for a firm is  r u + . We assume that different firms are characterized by different 
restructuring potentials r so that r is distributed with a strictly positive density f on  [ ] r r,,  
where  0 < r  and  0 > r . The distributional assumptions imply that there will be a set of firms 
for which the status quo is preferable to additional investment (those for which  0 < r ). 
These can be interpreted as those firms which are so inefficient that profits obtained from 
new assets acquired at market price are not enough to compensate for the costs of acquiring 
                                                 
4 According to Roland, strategic restructuring “refers to the objective of innovation and investment 
necessary to enhance enterprise performance” (2000, p. 234). This is the notion of restructuring we 
use here.   
5 If it is, then a measure of the extent to which a firm has acquired assets from SOEs as opposed to 
the private sector, may be correlated to asset stripping. How strong this correlation is, will then be an 
empirical question: in section 3, we will use the percentage of capital coming from SOEs as a proxy 
for a firm’s degree of involvement in asset stripping and we will argue that there is evidence to 
suggest that this measure does indeed capture the phenomenon.   
6That all firms share a common value u  might seem a strong assumption. However, this simplifies 
our analysis considerably and our results are robust to more realistic assumptions about the   5
the assets themselves.  
Alternatively, the assets can be acquired from SOEs (asset stripping) and this 
generates different returns, which are captured by the continuously differentiable function 
v(r), so that total utility with asset stripping is  ) (r v u + . We assume (1) that the cost of 
acquiring the assets from the private sector is always greater than the cost of acquiring them 
through SOEs so that v(r) is always greater than r, (2) that the cost of acquiring the assets 
with asset stripping is so low that even the most inefficient firm would want to utilize 
stripped assets ( () 0 > r v ), and (3) that  ( )
1 0 < <
dr
r dv
.  
As we will show in more detail below, the first two assumptions will imply that, 
absent law enforcement, asset stripping is always preferable to restructuring or even to the 
status quo. The last assumption, however, states that as firms become more efficient, gains 
from asset stripping increase but not as much as the gains from restructuring. The logic 
behind this assumption is that as the profitability of the assets increases, the state will have a 
greater incentive to invest in reducing both the control and informational gap with SOE 
insiders so that the opportunities for assets stripping reduce and/or the price differential 
between assets from SOEs and the private sector shrinks. This makes the returns from asset 
stripping closer to those from restructuring. 
While asset stripping is the cheapest way to obtain assets, it is not without risks since 
the government can decide to act against it in order to avoid the consequent deadweight 
costs (these costs are discussed below). We assume that if a government decides to act and 
this is successful, the firm is left with zero utility, thus losing even its status quo utility u .  
On the other hand, asset strippers can influence the government’s decision to act. In 
particular, firms who intend to utilize stripped assets will provide the government with 
private benefits (e.g. bribes or political support), in exchange for its inaction. 
In order to model these private benefits, we assume that each firm is also 
characterized by a parameter s, which is distributed independently of r and with strictly 
positive density g on [ ] s , 0
7. The parameter s, represents the size of the firm’s current assets: 
the larger s is, the greater the private benefits provided to the government so that these 
                                                                                                                                                      
distribution of firms’ returns on current assets.   6
benefits are proportional (and, for simplicity, equal) to s. Two things are important to note 
here. The first is that to keep matters simple, we do not model the cost of providing these 
private benefits directly: the only assumption needed for our results is that even with them, 
the direct costs of asset stripping are lower than the costs of acquiring assets from the private 
sector so that returns for the former are higher than returns for the latter. The second is that 
we assume that s (and not r) determines a firm’s ability to provide private benefits because r 
is a measure of returns on investment, not overall spending ability. A small firm could have 
a high value of r  because it is very efficient but be relatively incapable of providing 
significant bribes simply because it is small. A further reason for arguing that s and not r is 
the relevant variable here, is that as well as providing bigger direct monetary benefits, larger 
firms have more political clout because their fortunes impact more voters and this makes it 
more difficult for politicians to act against them.
8  
Following the recent literature in political economy (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), 
we assume that the government has both a “benevolent” and a “egoistic” side: on the one 
hand, the government seeks to maximize total efficiency in society, but on the other hand it 
also cares about the possible private benefits it may receive in exchange for inaction on asset 
stripping.  
We model these assumptions by representing the government's objective function as 
() , 1 B W U G α α − + =  where W is equal to the returns on investment generated by firms in 
society and B represents the overall private benefits the government receives.  [] 1 , 0 ∈ α  is a 
parameter that represents the trade-off between the government's concerns for public welfare 
and its own private welfare.  
If the government decides to act against asset stripping, it must pay a per-firm cost of 
c and it is effective only with probability (1-q). If it doesn’t act, it faces a large deadweight 
cost because of the welfare losses associated with asset stripping. Amongst these losses is 
that stripped assets are generally not allocated to their most efficient user, that there will be a 
perception of a lack of protection of property rights (with negative consequences on 
investments), that the perceived lack of fairness in the process may make the whole 
                                                                                                                                                      
7 In our dataset, the independence assumption is not rejected. 
8 See Shleifer and Vishny (1994) or Debande and Friebel (2004) for a similar assumption.    7
transition unpopular, and the fact that the financial sector may be forced to take on too much 
risk.
9  
We model the government’s payoffs as follows: for any firm that does not use 
stripped assets, welfare returns to the government are equal to those of the firms themselves 
(thus, the government gets either u  or  r u + ) while private benefits are zero since there is 
no need to buy the government’s acquiescence.
10 Similarly, for any firm that does use 
stripped assets but is unsuccessful because the government acts and the firm is caught, we 
assume that the government optimally re-allocates the assets thus generating again returns 
equal to the case described above. Finally, to keep things as simple as possible, we assume 
that if the firm does use stripped assets and the government doesn’t act or acts but cannot 
stop the stripping, the deadweight cost is such that welfare returns W are zero. Private 
benefits (bribes or political support) occur only if the government didn’t act in the first 
place. 
The whole game is common knowledge to firms while the government cannot 
observe a firm’s r
11 nor whether it has actually stripped assets or not.
 This implies that the 
government is aware of the size of a firm but it is not aware of its potential for restructuring 
or asset stripping and it doesn’t know which firms have stripped assets and which haven't.
12   
Figure 1 summarizes payoffs for firms and for the government. We define the 
strategies available to firms as N (no change), R (restructure), and S (asset stripping) while 
A means that the government decides to act and -A that it decides not to take action.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
9 If stripped assets end up in the informal economy or lead to capital flight, asset stripping implies 
other potentially significant costs.  
10 Obviously, there might still be private benefits from other sources but here we focus solely on the 
benefits provided by asset stripping firms in order to stop the government from acting in this specific 
regard. 
11 This is in accordance with the notion that SOE control is in the hands of managers who are the 
only ones who can judge how efficiently can a buyer firm use those assets. 
 
12 Alternatively, one could assume that while not able to determine a firm's precise r, the government 
can tell whether or not asset stripping has occurred simply by looking at whether or not the asset 
comes from SOEs. Thus, enforcement is not a problem of finding asset strippers but only a problem 
of convicting them. This assumes that different government branches (those in charge of SOEs and 
those in charge of law enforcement) can coordinate with each other, which is a strong assumption.   8
 
The timing of the model is as follows. In the first stage, firms choose one of the three 
possibilities: N, R or S. In the second stage and upon observing s for each firm, the 
government decides whether to act against the firm or not. Nature determines the success of 
the possible action against asset stripping and payoffs are realized.  
To analyze the model, we proceed by backward induction and for simplicity will 
consider only equilibria in pure strategies. In the second stage, the government has to decide 
whether or not to act. This implies resolving a trade-off. On the one hand, acting will result 
in higher welfare because it reduces asset stripping. On the other, if it acts, it has to pay the 
cost of enforcements and will get no private benefits (e.g., bribes or political support). In 
addition, the government can observe s but not r so that it may form expectations as to 
whether the firm is an asset stripper but cannot know that for sure. Since private benefits are 
increasing in s this implies that the government’s strategy will be one where action will be 
chosen for all firms such that s is no greater than some type 
* s,   while inaction will be 
chosen in the opposite case. Formally, we have:  
 
 Proposition 1 The government will decide to enforce the law if   ) , min(
* s s s ≤  while it will 
not act against any firm of size  ) , 0 (
* s Max s >  where s
* is the solution to  
() () ( ) ( ) s A B E s A W E c s A B E s A W E F F F F , ) 1 ( , , ) 1 ( , − − + − = − − + α α α α  (1) 
where F is the distribution function for r,  ( ) s X W EF ,  and ( ) s X B EF ,  are the expected values 
of W and B conditional on s and the government choosing strategy  . , A A X − =    
Note that () s A W EF ,  is independent of s because returns do not depend on firm size. 
Also, () s A W EF , −  equals zero because when government does not act, there will be asset 
stripping, while  () s A B EF ,  is equal to zero because if the government acts it will not receive 
any private benefit. Finally, () s A B EF , −  is equal to s because these are the private benefits 
received in exchange for inaction. This means that equation (1) becomes  
() s c A W EF ) 1 ( α α − = −           (2) 
                                                                                                                                                      
Either way, our main results are not affected.   9
where the left-hand side term is constant in s while the right-hand side is an increasing 
function of s. 
To determine  () A W EF  explicitly, consider the behavior of a firm manager when she 
has to decide whether to strip assets, do nothing or restructure. As mentioned, our 
assumptions imply that if there is no government action expected, asset stripping is a 
dominant strategy for all firms. If a firm expects government action, on the other hand, it 
will face the following choice. If it decides to strip assets, expected utility is  ( ) ) (r v u q + : the 
probability that government action will be ineffective times the gains from asset stripping. If 
it decides to do nothing, her utility is u . Finally, if it decides to restructure, utility is  r u + . 
Thus, asset stripping is the preferred option if ( ) ( ) 0 , ) ( r Max u r v u q + ≥ +
13. Hence, we have 
two cases. In the first, firms are inefficient and asset stripping requires  ( ) u r v u q ≥ + ) ( , while 
in the second case, firms are efficient and asset stripping requires that ( ) r u r v u q + ≥ + ) ( .  
It is easy to see that our assumptions on the function v(r)  ensure that the first 
inequality determines a value  ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛ −
=
− u
q
q
v rA
1 1  such that asset stripping will occur for all 
firms such that  A r r >  while nothing will be done for the remaining firms.
14 The 
interpretation is that some firms are so inefficient that additional assets obtained through 
asset stripping will not improve their performance enough to compensate for the risk of 
getting caught. It is also easy to see that our assumptions guarantee that  A r  is increasing in 
u  as the opportunity cost of asset stripping increases and decreasing in q  because the 
probability of being caught decreases.  
The second inequality (implicitly) determines a value  A B r r >  such that asset 
stripping occurs for all efficient firms such that  B r r < , while the remaining efficient firms 
will restructure. So, the most efficient firms will not utilize stripped assets and will be 
restructured because these firms are so productive that high returns can be made without the 
                                                 
13 We focus on equilibria where indifference between asset stripping and one of the other options is 
resolved in favor of the former.  
14 Both here and for the value  B r  below, we assume that the parameter restrictions necessary for 
[ ) 0 , r rA ∈  and  ( ] r rB , 0 ∈  are satisfied.   10
risks associated with asset stripping. Again, it is easy to see that  B r  is decreasing in u  and 
increasing in q for the same reasons described above.  
Given this analysis, we have that (2) becomes  
() () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] s c F r F r F r q r F r F q u B B B A B ) 1 ( 0 1 α α − = − ∆ + + − − − −    (3)      
 
where  F  is the left-integral of the distribution function F and  () ( ) r F F r − + = ∆ 0 . This 
leads to: 
 
Proposition 2  In equilibrium,    
   
  () () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
α
α
−
− ∆ + + − − − −
=
1
0 1 * c F r F r F r q r F r F q u
s
B B B A B     (4)   
 
Further, firms will always strip assets if their size is above 
* s . If their size is below 
* s , firms 
will be partitioned in three categories according to their potential profitability: firms in 
[] B A r r ,   will resort to asset stripping, firms in [ ) A r r,  will do nothing and firms in ( ] r rB,  will 
restructure. 
A corollary to the proposition above that follows from simple differentiation is: 
 
Corollary 3   Assuming  ( ) s s , 0
* ∈ , we have that 
* s  
1.  Is increasing in how much government cares for welfare as opposed to private benefits 
() α . 
2.  Is decreasing in the cost of government action (c). 
3.  Is increasing in the status quo value of firms’ assets ( ) u . 
4.  Is decreasing in the probability of ineffectiveness of law enforcement (q).  
 
Figure 2 summarizes these results. A firm's potential returns are on the horizontal axis, 
while its size is on the vertical axis. 
   11
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The figure shows how governments partition firms in two categories: those for whom 
action is worthwhile (firms in II, III and IV) and those for whom it isn't (firms in I). In 
region I there is no action, managers will always use stripped assets and government only 
gets private benefits. In regions II, III and IV government acts so that no private benefits are 
accruing to it but action does stop some firms from using stripped assets: in region II firms 
do nothing (these firms are all inefficient) and in region IV firms will restructure. In both 
cases, there are public benefits to the government. In region III, all firms use stripped assets 
even with government action. However, if these firms are caught, the government will 
reclaim the assets and allocate them optimally.  
The intuition for this pattern is that the government trades off the public benefits of 
action against the private benefits obtained if there is no action. This trade off is directly 
affected by changes in the parameters α  and c: if α  increases (i.e., the government is less 
interested in private benefits), the difference in returns between I versus II, III and IV 
changes in favor of the latter. Given that, it is optimal for the government to act against 
larger firms. Conversely, if c (the cost of law enforcement) increases, net returns for the 
government stay the same, but now action has become more expensive so that there is an 
incentive for the government to reduce the maximum size of firms for which it will enforce 
the law. The intuition from the firm point of view is that there will be three types of firms 
below s*. On one extreme, there are firms that are so inefficient that it is not worthwhile for 
them either to restructure or to take on the law enforcement risks associated the use of 
stripped assets. On the other extreme, we have highly efficient firms for which there is no 
need to use stripped assets because potential profitability through restructuring is high vis-à-
vis the risk of getting caught using stripped assets. It is the remaining firms (those with 
intermediate levels of efficiency and sufficient clout) that will strip assets.  
While the first two parameters directly influence the government’s preferences, u  
and q influence its decision to act indirectly, through firms’ behavior. Any increase in u  
(which could be interpreted as a measure of the average efficiency in the economy) will 
increase the opportunity cost of stripping assets for any firm facing action from the 
government. Thus, when government takes action, fewer firms strip assets, increasing the 
government’s returns which leads to government action against a larger section of firms,   12
increasing 
* s . An increase in q, (action becomes less effective) provides the opposite effect 
since now, the opportunity cost of asset stripping decreases.  
  To conclude, this section has provided a simple theoretical framework for the 
analysis of firms' decisions with regard to asset stripping and government's decision to act 
against it or not. The two main testable empirical implications from our model are:  
 
(a) Governments will be more willing to act against small firms because these cannot 
have the same level of political influence as large firms. This means that large firms 
have more incentives to strip assets than small firms.  
 
(b) For those firms that do face law enforcement, we expect asset stripping to be 
more frequent if they are at an intermediate level of potential profitability. Jointly 
with (a), this means that the relationship is non-linear.   
 
 
III. DATA 
We use the data set put together by Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) to test the main 
implications of our model of asset stripping in transition economies. The survey was carried 
out in 1997 through face-to-face interviews with owners, CEOs or general managers of 
about 300 firms in five transition economies (Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and 
Russia).
 Most of these were founded after 1990 and Johnson et al. (2002) argue that “the 
resulting sample is reasonably representative of small and medium-sized manufacturing 
firms in each country, though it is not a census” (p. 45).
 15    
The data set has a few disadvantages we should mention at the outset. One likely 
drawback is that the data were collected with different purposes, to capture contractual 
                                                 
15 According to Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), “In order to increase the cross-country 
comparability of the sample, the initial selection was limited to one medium-sized city in each 
country: Katowice (Poland), Brasov (Romania), Bratislava (Slovakia), Volgograd (Russia) and 
Dnepopetrovsk (Ukraine). Only in Slovakia did we have trouble identifying a large enough sample of 
firms meeting our size criteria who were willing to participate. In the final sample, about one-quarter 
of the Slovakian firms are located in Bratislava, one-quarter in Kosice, and the remaining half are 
spread across seven other cities. Participation was high among the firms contacted –in excess of 70% 
in Poland and Romania, and 68% in Slovakia.”    13
relations between the firm and its suppliers and customers. Therefore the set of variables of 
potential interest for a study of asset stripping is limited. Another disadvantage is that the 
survey is limited to a single year, with no time series aspect to it. A third possible 
disadvantage is that firms from only five transition economies were interviewed. Finally, the 
sample does not include firms with large number of employees. This makes it harder to 
capture some factors that may impact on a firms’ ability to exercise influence over law 
enforcement, such as the political connections that managers may have or the fact that the 
firm has so many employees-voters that government is reluctant to act against it. However, 
there are other means of influence such as bribes which are available to small and medium 
sized firms and yet in a degree proportional to their size. Because this data set cannot capture 
the full variety of ways of influencing public officials that large firms may have, we expect 
any results that support our theory to be conservative estimates of the true relationship 
between firm size and asset stripping.   
  We believe that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. One important 
advantage is that, although cross-sectional, the survey was carried out in 1997. This was a 
year close enough to the beginning of the transition so that managers and owners 
remembered how much of their capital came from state-owned enterprises. Yet 1997 was 
also far enough from the beginning of the transition that most asset stripping would be over 
and owners and managers would not be as reluctant to disclose its extent. Another important 
advantage is that although the survey does not cover all transition economies, the group of 
five countries displays a useful array of speeds and types of institutional and economic 
reform and initial conditions.
16 A third positive feature is that the survey encompasses firms 
from different manufacturing sectors (namely, metal products, wood, food, clothing, 
construction, chemical, pulp and paper, handicrafts, and electric equipment), allowing us to 
control for potentially crucial sectoral differences, including capital intensity. And a fourth 
positive feature regards the relatively large number of firms from each country. This allows 
us enough degrees of freedom to be able, for instance, to discard from the sample those 
firms that were previously parts of state-owned enterprises (spin-off firms) since capital 
                                                 
16 For instance, in terms of progress in transition the EBRD (1999) indicators place Poland as a top 
all-around performer and Slovakia as a good performer with caveats in terms of accountability and 
transparency. Romania is classified as an intermediate case, while Russia and Ukraine, in this order, 
complete the ranking.   14
from state enterprises is, almost by definition, more likely to be found in a spin-off than in a 
start-up firm.  
Thus, in order to provide estimates of asset stripping that are conservative, we limit 
our attention to start-up firms and we do that by keeping in the sample only those firms that 
answer “no” to the question “was this firm previously a part of a state enterprise?” We start 
out with slightly less than 1,500 firms in the five countries
 and once we restrict it to those 
firms that were not previously part of a state-owned firm, the sample reduces to 966 firms: 
237 in Poland, 238 in Slovakia, 281 in Romania, 128 in Ukraine and 82 in Russia.
17  
 
  The measure of asset stripping we propose is the percentage of the firm's capital 
equipment obtained from a state enterprise. We refer to physical capital currently owned by 
a start-up firm that originated from a state-owned enterprise. In the survey, the question is 
phrased as follows: “How much of your capital equipment came from state enterprises 
which helped found this firm?” The respondent is asked to indicate whether the answer to 
this question is 0 %, 1-25 %, 26-50 %, 51-75 % or 76-100%. Notice that the question is 
restricted to capital equipment and excludes profits, buildings, brands, patents and land, 
which are assets that might also have been subject to stripping.  
  Admittedly, one important problem with this measure is the possibility that not all 
capital from SOEs in a start-up firm was acquired through asset stripping, as we defined it. It 
may well be the case that the firm obtained those assets at their market value and not through 
inside deals with managers, bureaucrats or politicians.
  Our response to this objection is 
twofold. 
Firstly, the empirical analysis will show that with this measure we get results that are 
compatible with the theory but cannot be easily explained if the measure simply reflected the 
choice between capital from former SOEs and capital from the private sector. In particular, 
there is strong evidence for a non-linear relationship between a firm’s profitability and this 
measure. If the measure did not capture asset stripping, it would be difficult to understand 
why such a relationship would obtain. In other words, why would firms with intermediate 
                                                 
17 It must be noted that all econometric results presented in this paper are, not surprisingly, even 
stronger when we use the full sample (that is, start-up as well as spin-off firms). These are available 
from the authors upon request.   15
levels of profitability choose to use a higher percentage of capital from SOEs than very 
profitable or very unprofitable firms?  
Secondly, we find large differences across countries in terms of our index. Table 1 
shows that the percentage of start-up firms that say that a positive share of their initial 
capital stock came from the state sector is much greater in Russia and Ukraine than 
elsewhere. The index strongly suggests this share is much larger in Russia and Ukraine than 
in Poland, Slovakia and Romania.
18  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This ranking in terms of our index maps quite well with country rankings based on 
government corruption and performance in transition (Treisman, 2003.) This is what we 
should expect according to our theory, as these are precisely the factors that should increase 
SOE insiders’ control and informational advantages, which make asset stripping easier. 
What else can explain these country-level differences and still be compatible with the notion 
that little or no asset stripping is being captured by our index? One possibility is that there 
are differences in privatization strategies, which could account for the different distribution 
of former state assets in the start-ups of the different countries. This is unlikely to be the 
case. In terms of the actual amount of privatization that occurred, by 1997 the private sector 
share in GDP was 55% for Ukraine, 60% for Romania, 65% for Poland, 70% for Russia and 
75% for Slovakia (EBRD 1999): this is at odds with the notion that the larger share of 
capital from SOEs in Ukrainian firms is due to the fact that Ukraine privatized more. 
Further, the cross-country aspect of the data is useful because these five countries have 
employed different privatization methods. Among the countries in our sample, Russia and 
Slovakia used voucher schemes extensively in their privatization processes, while Romania 
and Ukraine emphasized privatization to insiders (management buyouts). This contrasts with 
the possibility that the similarity in the index between Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, 
and Romania and Slovakia, on the other, is due purely to the privatization method involved.  
                                                 
 
18 Not surprisingly, the percentage of firms that answer “zero” is substantially smaller if we consider 
start-ups and spin-offs:  81% for Poland (down from 95%), 79% for Slovakia (down from 96%), 
76% for Romania (down from 87%), 33% for Ukraine (down from 62%) and 19% for Russia (down 
from 64%).   16
  A second possible problem with our measure relates to the sectoral distribution of 
economic activity across countries. If it was the case that firms in sectors with more SOE 
capital all belonged to certain countries (in particular, Russia and Ukraine), then we could 
not be confident that our index reflects actual stripping of assets. All the transfer of assets 
from state firms to the start-ups in our sample could have been done without asset stripping 
and the differences across countries explained simply by the different sectoral compositions 
in the sample. This is not the case. The econometric evidence presented below shows that we 
do not find statically significant differences in explaining asset stripping by country across 
sectors. 
This does not necessarily mean that sectoral differences in themselves are not 
important. Table 2 shows the distribution of asset stripping across industrial sectors, 
irrespective of country of operation. One way of reading the table is to try to identify those 
sectors with the lowest share of firms saying that zero percent of their capital came from 
state enterprises (those will be the sectors with relatively more asset stripping according to 
our measure). From Table 2, we identify handicrafts, wood and food products and clothing 
as the sectors in which asset stripping is relatively low. On the other hand, asset stripping 
seems relatively high in metal parts, construction, chemical products, electrical machinery 
and in pulp and paper. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The theoretical model presented above generates two main testable hypotheses. One is that 
firm size (as a proxy for the firm’s political clout or ability to bribe) is an important 
determinant of asset stripping in transition economies. The other is that there is a non-linear 
relationship between the extent of the use of stripped assets and potential profitability. In this 
section, we investigate whether our data provides support for these two main hypotheses.  
  We focus our analysis on the probability of using stripped assets.
19 In order to do 
that, we recode the original variable to take values of 1 if the share of capital from former 
                                                 
19 One may expect that the percentage of stripped assets on total initial capital equipment is more 
important than the decision of whether or not to use stripped assets. There are no qualitative changes 
in the results if ordered probit estimation is applied instead. These results are available from the 
authors upon request.   17
SOEs is positive, and zero otherwise. Table 3 presents maximum-likelihood probit estimates 
for our measure of asset stripping. Column 1 shows our results when we control for country 
and industry-specific characteristics. It shows that size, as measured by total number of 
employees at the date the firm was founded, is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of asset stripping, as our model predicts. The coefficient implies that, at the 
mean, an increase of one unit in the size of the firm (that is, one additional employee) leads 
to an increase in the probability of using stripped assets of 0.04 percentage points.
20 There 
are some other important results with respect to the fixed effects. Romania was chosen as the 
reference category for the countries and “miscellaneous” as the reference category for the 
industrial sectors. According to our measure of asset stripping, once again it seems to be a 
more severe problem in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland and Slovakia. In terms of the 
industrial sectors, the results are less informative. Yet, there is evidence suggesting that asset 
stripping is less severe in the food and handicrafts industries.
 21 These sector specific fixed 
effects help to minimize the risk that our results are driven by the different capital intensities 
of the average firm in different sectors.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
One potential problem with these results is that the variable capturing firm size 
includes part-time workers. The data set offers an alternative, namely the number of full-
time workers at the date the firm was founded. Column 2 shows our results if we use this 
different measure of firm size. We again find that larger firms seem to have more stripped 
assets from state-owned enterprises. Notice that using a measure of firm size at the date the 
firm started to operate helps to address endogeneity concerns. Further, the pattern of results 
with respect to the country dummies does not change. As for differences across industries, 
one change is that using full-time workers as a measure of size, the clothing sector also 
                                                 
20 Note that if we include spin-off firms in our sample, the coefficient on firm size implies that an 
increase in firm size of one employee leads to an increase in the probability of using stripped assets 
of 0.3 percentage points (vis-à-vis 0.04). 
 
21 In principle, it is possible that different sectors in different countries are systematically more (or 
less) prone to have stripped assets. In order to account for this, we tried adding interaction terms 
between our country and sector dummies to these specifications. There are no qualitative changes in   18
appears to have been subjected to less asset stripping. Once again, country specific factors 
seem more important than sectoral effects in explaining asset stripping in transition. 
  A third important issue for our understanding of asset stripping in transition is the 
age of each firm. It is important to make sure that these results are not driven by differences 
in how long these private firms have been in operation (e.g., latecomers or newer firms 
having less access to capital from state-owned enterprises). Column 3 presents these results 
when controlling for the year the firm was registered and our preferred measure of firm size 
(number of full-time employees). The results change very little and ability to influence law 
enforcement as measured by firm size is still an important determinant.
22 Further, the pattern 
of results obtained with the country and sector dummies remains. Column 4 shows that using 
another measure of age, namely the year when the firm started operating, generates similar 
results. 
   One important question is whether any potential omitted variable affect these results. 
One might expect that other factors would influence the propensity to strip assets, such as 
personal characteristics and occupational history of the firm’s CEO, the firm’s access to 
credit and the expectations about legal institutions that govern its behavior. It is important, 
therefore, to test whether the inclusion of such variables would affect our results. Column 5 
reports the results when measures of such factors are included. Firstly, we look at whether or 
not the manager had previous public sector experience. We conjecture that such experience 
would provide knowledge and connections that would facilitate the stripping of assets. As 
can be seen in Column 5, the coefficient has the positive sign we expect, but it is not 
statistically significant.
23  
  Column 5 in Table 3 also shows how our results change when we take into account 
the issue of firms’ access to credit. Specifically, we consider whether our firms received 
                                                                                                                                                      
our results.  
 
22 The coefficient implies that, at the mean, an increase of one unit in the size of the firm leads to an 
increase in the probability of using stripped assets of 0.04 percentage points. 
23 We have also tried managers’ age, years of formal education and whether they have been high-
level managers before. We find that the coefficients on age and years of education were both 
statistically significant. Older managers were more likely to use stripped assets, as well as those with 
lower levels of formal schooling. Previous occupation, however, had no significant effect. More 
importantly, we repeated this exercise for all the specifications in this paper and our results continue 
to hold.   19
start-up financing from state owned enterprises. Perhaps not surprisingly, those firms that 
received credit from this source are found to have a higher propensity to use stripped 
assets.
24 The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and 
implies that having received start-up funding from a SOE increase the probability of using 
stripped assets by 6 percentage points. Finally, in Column 5 we also investigate the effect of 
expectations about legal institutions. More specifically, we ask whether the fact that a 
manager claims that firms in his or her industry pay for the “protection” of their activities 
increases the propensity to strip assets.
25 We conjecture that firms that operate in an 
environment where such protection is needed are likely to face less effective law 
enforcement as well as government with higher propensity to accept bribes. Indeed, we find 
the coefficient on “protection” payments to be positive and statistically significant, and it 
implies that such payments increase the probability of using stripped assets by 10.4 
percentage points.
26 The most important point, however, is that with all these controls, size 
remains a significant factor in explaining asset stripping. 
The data set offers some additional measures of institutional effectiveness reflecting 
these differences. For instance, the survey asks firms to estimate the average share of 
unreported sales in total sales in their sector of activity.
 Table 4 exhibits these results, using 
the preferred measures of firm size and firm age (number of full-time employees at start of 
operation and year of start of operation, respectively).
27 Column 1 shows that size is still an 
important determinant, although the coefficient on the institutional variable (share of 
                                                 
24 We also investigated whether other sources of finance had an impact. Specifically, we looked at 
whether or not financing was obtained from own funds, from family and friends, from other private 
firms, from banks, and from issuing shares. Also we examined the composition of start-up financing 
by examining the effect of the share of each of these sources on overall finance. None of these 
coefficients were found to be statistically significant. Again, we repeated this exercise for all the 
specifications in this paper and our results remain. 
25 We also studied whether the amount of time spent by the manager dealing with government 
bureaucracy (as opposed to internal and external affairs) affects the propensity to strip assets. We 
find that this coefficient is statistically significant and positive as expected. Once more, we repeated 
this exercise for all the specifications in this paper and our results remain. 
26 Notice that these latter two variables are binary so these estimates are presented as the discrete 
change in probability of going all the way from zero to one (as opposed to a continuous small change 
as in the case of firm size). 
27 Note that we exclude country dummies because of severe multicollinearity between these and the 
institutional variables.    20
unreported sales on total sales) is not statistically significant.
28 Column 2 from Table 4 has 
similar results for another proxy for institutional conditions, the share of unreported salaries 
in total salaries. Although the major predictions from our model are borne out by the data, 
these results suggest an apparently counter-intuitive result for this institutional variable: the 
larger the relative share of unreported salaries, the smaller is asset stripping. One possible 
explanation is substitution: firms that cannot use stripped assets try to under-report their 
labor costs. Column 3 shows our results when the institutional variable is the share of input 
costs that are unreported. Note that the coefficient on institutions carries the expected sign: 
the higher the degree of underreporting (input costs in this case) the more likely the firm has 
looted assets. Column 4 shows the results for using the share of unreported exports in total 
exports and column 5 shows the same set of results when the institutional variable is the 
share of unreported imports in total imports. For these last two cases, although the 
coefficients on these institutional variables have the expected positive signs, only the one on 
exports is statistically significant. This coefficient implies that, at the mean, a one percent 
increase in the share of unreported exports, increase the probability of using stripped assets 
by 0.09 percentage points. Column 6 shows the effects of the share of time the manager 
spends dealing with government bureaucracy and regulations (as opposed to the firms’ 
internal and external affairs). This coefficient is positive and statistically significant. 
Similarly to the analysis of the previous table, we emphasize that firm size is still an 
important explanatory factor (in a more complicated way than previously thought) in 
understanding asset stripping in transition.
29 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
28 Notice that the number of observations is considerably smaller than before and this is caused by 
the much higher number of firms that did not answer the institutional questions that are the focus of 
Table 4. One potential concern is that the smaller number of observations would influence the main 
results reported in Table 3. Thus, we re-run all specifications in Table 3 only for those firms that did 
actually answer these institutional questions. We find that there is no effect of the smaller number of 
observations on our results.  
29 One can argue that the joint effect of firm size and the institutions that determine the effectiveness 
of law enforcement has to be taken into account. We re-estimated these specifications adding 
interaction terms between firm size and the relevant institutional variable. Although the interaction 
terms were never statistically significant, our main results remained.     21
Table 5 tests one of the main implications of the model. Recall that, in terms of 
efficiency, we predict there will be three types of firms. We first have firms with very low 
(relative) efficiency. For these, the expected payoff is so low that asset stripping does not 
occur. For the (relatively) highly efficient firms, there is no need to use stripped assets: 
potential returns are so high that the risk of getting caught is not worth taking. The third type 
of firm has intermediate levels of efficiency and is willing to use stripped assets, even if it 
risks being caught. Empirically this hypothesis translates into testing whether there is an 
inverted-U relationship between efficiency and asset stripping. One available measure of this 
relative efficiency, at the moment the firm was founded, is profitability. Column 1 shows 
that the share of after-tax profits over total investment in the first full year of operation of the 
firm has a positive and significant impact on asset stripping (notice that this result obtains 
irrespective of whether or not we control for the age of the firm). It is important to 
emphasize that these are not raw profits, but a measure of returns on investment along the 
lines suggested by our model. Column 2 shows that there is support in the data for the 
inverted-U theoretical prediction: the coefficient on the linear term is positive and 
statistically significant while the coefficient on the quadratic term is negative and 
statistically significant. Our main results are in Columns 3 and 4: the size of the firm is still a 
fundamental determinant of asset stripping in transition even when accounting for non-linear 
differences in firm profitability.
30 Column 4 shows these results change little when we 
include controls for manager occupational history, payments for “protection” and start-up 
financing from SOEs. Our results remain and, again, the effects of payments for “protection” 
and start-up financing from SOEs are statistically significant.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
 
30 These results are also robust to the presence of a privatization variable that takes the value of 1 if 
“direct sales” was the primary or secondary method of privatization. These results are available from 
the authors upon request. These data are from Garibaldi et al. (2002), who construct three indicator 
variables ranking primary, secondary and tertiary privatization methods in all transition economies, 
yearly between 1990 and 1999. They consider three privatization methods: direct sales, vouchers and 
management-employee buyouts. Garibaldi et al. show that up to 1997, “direct sales” was never the 
primary method in any of our five countries. Further, up to 1997, “direct sales” was never the 
primary nor secondary method in Poland nor Ukraine. It was the secondary method for Russia after 
1995, for Slovakia after 1992 and for Romania after 1993 (with the exception of 1996).   22
 
A final important issue is the direction of causality: do large firms do more asset 
stripping, as we suggest, or do firms that use stripped assets grow faster? Unfortunately, the 
data lacks the time series aspect needed for a comprehensive test of this possibility. There is 
however an indirect way of testing this, namely by examining the effects of the use of 
stripped assets on firm growth. Table 6 has these results. Column 1 shows that, although 
firm growth does not seem different across sectors, it certainly differs across countries. 
Polish and Slovak firms seem to have grown much faster than their Romanian, Ukrainian 
and Russian counterparts. Second, the initial size of the firm matters for its subsequent 
growth: the smaller the firm, the faster it seems to have grown. Third, older firms seem to 
have grown faster than newer firms (notice that more than 60% of the firms in our sample 
start to operate between 1991 and 1994.) Column 2 adds our measure of asset stripping to 
this specification: the results just discussed remain. In addition, asset stripping has a positive 
effect on firm growth, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Column 3 
shows this result changes very little when we include controls for manager occupational 
history, payments for “protection” and start-up financing from SOEs. The fact that the 
coefficient on asset stripping is not significant suggests that causality runs in the direction 
we propose.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In summary, this section presented econometric evidence supporting the theoretical 
model. Specifically, the results seem to provide support for the two hypotheses. One is that 
firm size is an important determinant of asset stripping in transition economies: larger firms 
use more stripped assets. Another is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between 
profitability and asset stripping. These conclusions are robust to different proxies for 
institutional conditions, different estimators, differences in privatization methods, different 
sources of start-up financing, different managerial occupational histories, different ways of 
measuring firm size and different ways of measuring the age of the firm. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present a simple model of asset stripping in transition economies, which 
highlights the importance of political power and potential profitability. The model rests on 
the assumption that due to differences in the state’s ability to exercise control and obtain 
information, asset stripping is inherently easier if assets from SOEs are involved. We argued 
that relatively large firms, which use stripped assets, will be safe from law enforcement 
because governments understand that the costs of intervening against them (in terms of 
influence, bribes or political support) are larger than the benefits of reclaiming the stripped 
assets. 
Using firm-level survey data for about 950 firms in Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Romania, Ukraine and Russia in 1997, we find strong support for the two main theoretical 
implications from the model. A first important result is firm size turns out to be an important 
determinant of asset stripping in transition economies (and it does so in more complicated 
ways than previously thought.) This result is robust to different proxies for institutional 
conditions, different ways of measuring firm size, different ways of measuring the age of the 
firm and to the use of different estimators. A second important result is the finding of a non-
linear relationship between potential profitability and use of stripped assets: we find that 
those firms with sufficient political power and intermediate levels of potential profitability 
will be the ones that choose to use stripped assets. 
This is one of the first papers to provide a theoretical explanation of asset stripping in 
the transition from communism followed by supporting econometric evidence. It is natural 
thus that there are a number of suggestions for future research. One is that we offer a 
tractable model of asset stripping that is essentially static. It would be interesting to see 
whether a dynamic framework would generate strikingly different conclusions. Although we 
suspect that it would not in our case, we think that it would alter some findings in the 
literature, for instance, the notion that it is in the interest of the politically powerful social 
groups to have very imperfectly defined property rights. Although there is a clear rationale 
for such a situation at the outset, that is before assets change ownership, we believe that that 
will not be the case later on (after the ownership of assets has changed and the risk of 
expropriation is low.)   24
  Perhaps more importantly, we believe these results provide lessons for privatization 
that not are restricted to transition economies. As noted, the basic assumptions of our theory, 
that SOEs have weaker corporate governance and that public officials are vulnerable to 
influence from asset strippers hold true for many developing economies as well. The first 
observation that follows from our analysis is that the decision to privatize, or to recommend 
privatization, should take into account the potential costs of asset stripping whenever 
corporate oversight is weak and political incentives are unreliable. These costs can be 
substantial: as discussed above, our results are likely to have underestimated asset stripping 
and yet we have that an additional hundred employees increase the probability that the firm 
will use stripped assets by four percentage points. On the other hand, our results also allow 
policy makers to understand the specific cases, depending on the size of the firms involved 
and their profitability, in which asset stripping is more likely to happen.  
Thus, while our work has focused on transition economies, future work might focus 
on other developing countries in order to assess the generality of our theory. This could also 
address some weaknesses in our analysis, by exploring other forms of asset stripping, for 
instance, stripping that relate to other assets (such as buildings and infrastructure) and to 
intangibles (for example, brand names). Future research might also try to provide a better 
understanding of the connections between asset stripping and capital flight.  25
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Table 1 
The Extent of Asset Stripping Across Selected Transition Economies (1997) 
 
Country 0%  1-25%  26-50%  51-100%  Total 
 
Poland  95.76  2.97 0.00 1.27 100.00 
Slovakia   96.22  0.84   1.26  1.68   100.00 
Romania  87.19    9.25  2.14 1.42   100.00 
Ukraine   62.99   15.75   18.90   2.36   100.00 
Russia   64.20   25.93   8.64   1.23   100.00 
Total   86.40   7.89   4.15   1.55   100.00 
Note:  The figure refers to the percentage of answers in the category. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.     30
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
The Extent of Asset Stripping Across Industrial Sectors (1997) 
 
Main Business 
Activity  0% 1-25%  26-50%  51-100%  Total 
Metal Parts   87.01  7.36   3.90  1.73  100.00 
Wood   92.00   5.33   1.33   1.33  100.00 
Food    91.41  3.91 3.13 3.56    100.00 
Clothing    94.08  3.29 0.66 1.97 100.00 
Construction   77.01   16.09  5.75  1.15  100.00 
Chemical   88.46   7.69   1.28  2.56    100.00 
Paper    76.67  10.00 10.00   3.33  100.00 
Handicrafts    93.33  6.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Electric  86.44  5.08 8.47   0.00  100.00 
Miscellaneous  72.22 16.67 10.19 0.93  100.00 
Total   86.40   7.89   4.15  1.55   100.00 
Note:  The figure refers to the percentage of answers in the category. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.     31
 
Table 3.    
Determinants of Asset Stripping in Transition Economies:   
Size, Age, Country and Industry Effects (Probit Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm size (all employees)    0.003         
  [0.001]***      
Firm size (full time employees)  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
    [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year  firm  registered   -0.012    
    [0.009]    
Year firm started operation        -0.006  -0.007 
     [0.010]  [0.010] 
Dummy: Poland   -0.636 -0.62  -0.678 -0.649 -0.675 
  [0.175]*** [0.176]*** [0.186]*** [0.184]*** [0.198]*** 
Dummy: Slovakia  -0.655 -0.653 -0.646 -0.651 -0.685 
  [0.191]*** [0.192]*** [0.191]*** [0.191]*** [0.213]*** 
Dummy: Ukraine  0.794 0.8  0.81  0.818 1.149 
  [0.158]*** [0.159]*** [0.160]*** [0.160]*** [0.320]*** 
Dummy:  Russia  0.702 0.704 0.72  0.697 0.479 
  [0.192]*** [0.193]*** [0.193]*** [0.194]*** [0.357] 
Dummy:  Metal  -0.129 -0.135 -0.109 -0.113 -0.212 
  [0.187] [0.188] [0.190] [0.190] [0.231] 
Dummy: Wood  -0.4 -0.395  -0.364  -0.37  -0.466 
  [0.276] [0.276] [0.278] [0.278] [0.318] 
Dummy: Food  -0.552 -0.529 -0.487 -0.493 -0.506 
  [0.230]** [0.231]** [0.233]** [0.233]** [0.280]* 
Dummy: Cloth  -0.743 -0.733 -0.683 -0.688 -0.641 
  [0.241]*** [0.242]*** [0.243]*** [0.243]*** [0.285]** 
Dummy: Construction  0.09  0.104 0.118 0.125 0.187 
  [0.217] [0.217] [0.220] [0.219] [0.263] 
Dummy: Chemical  -0.111 -0.106 -0.073 -0.08  0.074 
  [0.252] [0.251] [0.255] [0.254] [0.282] 
Dummy: Pulp and paper  -0.036 -0.041 -0.013 -0.021 -0.07 
  [0.317] [0.314] [0.316] [0.316] [0.366] 
Dummy:  Handcrafts  -0.899 -0.891 -0.866 -0.782 -0.884 
  [0.535]*  [0.535]*  [0.533] [0.539] [0.570] 
Dummy:  Electric  -0.257 -0.257 -0.25  -0.243 -0.613 
  [0.256] [0.256] [0.258] [0.258] [0.368]* 
Experience in public sector        0.06 
      [ 0 . 1 6 1 ]  
Financing from SOE           0.514 
      [ 0 . 2 8 3 ] *  
Makes  “protection”payments      0.37 
      [ 0 . 2 0 7 ] *  
Constant -0.94  -0.944  0.16  -0.408  -0.342 
  [0.187]***  [0.188]***  [0.883] [0.916] [0.945] 
Observations  954 944 940 939 822   32
Log  likelihood  -312.17 -309.92 -307.71 -307.94 -227.63 
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. *** denotes statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * denotes statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.     37
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Determinants of Asset Stripping in Transition Economies:  
The Role of Institutional Conditions (Probit Estimates) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Firm size (full time employees)  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003 
  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]* [0.001]* [0.001]***
Year firm started operation  0.027  0.027  0.026  0.019  0.018  0.013 
 [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.015]*  [0.010]*  [0.009]** [0.009] 
Unreported sales, % of total  0.001           
 [0.003]           
Unreported wages, % of total    -0.006         
   [0.003]*         
Unreported input costs,% of total      0.006       
     [0.002]**       
Unreported exports, % of total          0.004     
         [0.002]**     
Unreported imports, % of total            0.003   
           [0.002]   
Percentage of manager time             0.024 
with government officials            [0.004]***
Constant -2.95  -2.816  -3.388  -2.213  -2.129  -2.269 
 [0.883]*** [0.873]*** [1.407]**  [0.914]**  [0.845]** [0.791]***
Country dummies?  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Industry dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 635  622  395  599  592  890 
Log likelihood  -270.54  -263.37  -120.95  -248.78  -244.27    -322.09  
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. *** denotes statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * denotes statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.     38
 
 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of Asset Stripping in Transition Economies:  
The Role of Profitability (Probit Estimates) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After-tax profit 1
st year (% inv.)  0.085  0.622  0.649  0.568 
 [0.044]*  [0.228]*** [0.237]***  [0.246]** 
Squared: After-tax profit 1
st year (% inv.)    -0.067  -0.067  -0.049 
    [0.029]** [0.030]** [0.031]* 
Year firm started operation  -0.008  -0.006  -0.013  -0.014 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] 
Firm size (full time employees)      0.003  0.003 
     [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Experience in public sector         0.009 
     [0.165] 
Financing from state enterprise        0.478 
     [0.280]* 
Makes  “protection”payments     0.417 
     [0.215]* 
Constant  -0.516 -1.638 -1.256 -1.155 
  [0.825] [0.951] [1.210] [1.252] 
Country  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  943 943 925 808 
Log  likelihood  -313.33 -311.27 -302.23 -220.79 
Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. *** 
denotes statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. * denotes statistically significant at the 10 percent level.   
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Table 6 
Do Firms Using Stripped Assets Grow Faster? 
Firm Growth Measured as Employment Growth (Ordinary Least Square Estimates) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Asset stripping as share of physical capital from SOE    0.382  0.447 
   [0.237]  [0.300] 
Firm size (full time employees)  -0.025  -0.026  -0.027 
 [0.008]***  [0.007]***  [0.007]*** 
Year firm started operation  -0.167  -0.165  -0.153 
 [0.055]***  [0.055]***  [0.056]** 
Dummy: Poland   2.25  2.289  2.708 
 [0.600]***  [0.605]***  [0.693]*** 
Dummy: Slovakia  0.838  0.874  1.223 
 [0.391]**  [0.393]**  [0.441]*** 
Dummy: Ukraine  -2.507  -2.681  -2.474 
 [0.272]***  [0.278]***  [0.660]*** 
Dummy: Russia  -2.016  -2.11  -1.987 
 [0.312]***  [0.320]***  [0.717]*** 
Dummy: Metal  -0.29  -0.279  -0.389 
 [0.547]  [0.548]  [0.674] 
Dummy: Wood  -0.113  -0.071  -0.199 
 [0.637]  [0.639]  [0.734] 
Dummy: Food  -0.349  -0.31  -0.417 
 [0.498]  [0.501]  [0.639] 
Dummy: Cloth  0.214  0.275  0.091 
 [0.543]  [0.548]  [0.672] 
Dummy: Construction  -0.863  -0.866  -1.042 
 [0.592]  [0.595]  [0.765] 
Dummy: Chemical  -0.137  -0.16  -0.339 
 [0.595]  [0.601]  [0.726] 
Dummy: Pulp and paper  0.77  0.765  0.86 
 [1.180]  [1.184]  [1.341] 
Dummy: Handcrafts  1.456  1.539  1.885 
 [2.719]  [2.723]  [3.207] 
Dummy: Electric  -0.934  -0.92  -1.284 
 [0.590]  [0.595]  [0.743]* 
Experience in public sector      1.262 
     [0.436]*** 
Financing from state enterprise      0.695 
     [0.431] 
Makes “protection” payments      -0.477 
     [0.562] 
Constant 18.645  18.023  15.8 
 [5.159]**  [5.185]**  [5.349]*** 
Observations 937  935  819 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15  0.15  0.13 
 Note: Standard errors, in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form. *** denotes 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level. * 
denotes statistically significant at the 10 percent level.    
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